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et al.: RECENT CASES

RECENT CASES
BILLS & NOTES-Facts Sufficient to Put on Inquiry Insufficient as Notice to Transferee. - Defendants gave a negotiable promissory note to a contractor as payment for repairs to defendants' residence. The contractor then sought to
transfer the note to plaintiff, who arranged for an inspection
of the premises before advancing funds. Plaintiff sent an inexperienced agent to view the premises and he erroneously
reported that the work had been satisfactorily completed. A
transfer of the note for value was subsequently made. Thereafter defendants defaulted, claiming failure of consideration,
and plaintiff brought action on the note. In the lower court,
the Master found that the work had been improperly done
and recommended that the balance required to perfect the
work be offset against the indebtedness to the plaintiff. The
circuit court reversed the Master's finding in this particular,
holding that the plaintiff was a holder in due course, free
from the defense of failure of consideration. On appeal, defendants contended that the plaintiff, at the time of transfer,
could have had knowledge of the construction defect had due
care been exercised in the inspection of the premises. HELD:
Plaintiff was a holder in due course, and mere knowledge
of facts sufficient to place him on inquiry, in the absence of
actual notice or evidence susceptible to the inference of bad
faith on his part, is insufficient to deprive him of his status.
CarolinaHousing & Mortgage Co. v. Reynolds, - S. C.
96 S. E. 2d 485.
To constitute notice of an infirmity in a negotiable instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating the same,
the person to whom it is negotiated must have had actual
knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such
facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad
faith. Negotiable Instruments Law, § 56; Code of Laws of
South Carolina 1952, § 8-886; 3 R. C. L. 1071. The rule in
England since 1824, and in early American cases, is that
knowledge of facts sufficient to put a reasonable and prudent
man on inquiry is sufficient to constitute notice to the transferee and to deprive him of his status as a holder in due
course. Gill v. Cubitt, 3 B. & C. 466, 107 Eng. Rep. 806
(1824) ; Hall v. Hale, 8 Conn. 366 (1831). There has been a
-'
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decided trend away from this rule in the United States in
recent years, though at least one jurisdiction still applies it,
Bright National Bank v. Hartman,61 Ind. App. 440, 109 N. E.
846 (1915), and another has enacted it into a statute. Civil
Code of Georgia, 1910 § 4291. Generally the English rule has
given way to a new rule which states that mere knowledge of
facts sufficient to put a reasonable man on inquiry wfll not
be sufficient to charge him with notice. Local Finance Co. v.
Charlton,__ Mo.
, 289 S. W. 2d 157 (1956) ; Bank of Anderson v. Breedin, 119 S. C. 39, 119 S. E. 799 (1922). Under
this rule, the mere presence of suspicious circumstances does
not impose on the transferee the duty to make inquiry. Hartford National Bank v. Credenza, 119 Conn. 368, 177 Atl. 132
(1935) ; Farmer's Bank v. Crawford, 103 S. C. 340, 88 S. E.
13 (1915). The duty to inquire arises only when facts are so
cogent and obvious that to remain passive would amount to
bad faith. Such was the case where a transferee was told by
the transferor that the bank issuing the note was insolvent,
and the certificate itself showed the maker bank to be in the
hands of the State Bank Examiner at the time of transfer,
Gray v. Thomas, 163 S. C. 421, 161 S. E. 473 (1931); also
where the transferee company discounted a note for an inadequate price, knowing of the maker's insolvency and without
further inquiry, thus justifying the conclusion that it feared
such inquiry would uncover a defect. Imperial Gypsum and
Oil Corporationv. Chaplin, 4 Cal. App. 2d 109, 40 P. 2d 596
(1935). Dishonest purpose, not failure to inquire or gross
negligence, establishes "bad faith" constituting notice of infirmity. Citizen's Bridge Co. v. Guerra, 152 Tex. 361, 258
S. W. 2d 64 (1953) ; II Scott, Trusts § 297.6. The law in South
Carolina and the majority of the jurisdictions in the United
States today is that mere suspicion of defect of title, or the
knowledge of circumstances which would excite such suspicion
in the mind of a prudent man, or gross negligence on the part
of the taker at the time of transfer, will not defeat his title.
Only bad faith can have this effect. Citizens' T & S Bank v.
Stackhouse, 91 S. C. 455, 74 S. E. 977 (1912).
One reason for abandoning the old rule was that it did not
provide a criterion upon which a verdict could be based. Suspicions appear differently to different minds. The standard
of prudence set by one juror may vary from that of another
juror equally experienced in business affairs. The more per-
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tinent reason for abandonment stems from the elevated position that commercial paper has attained in modern times.
It is said with authority that negotiable paper constitutes the
real currency of the country. Modern business methods hardly
make it feasible for the transferee to be put on his guard by
the mere presence of suspicious circumstances in the transfer of such an instrument. The law regards the security of
negotiable instruments in the hands of bona fide holders as
far more important than the preservation of defenses of those
who executed them. Therefore, it appears that the more recent rule is the better. Though it may be true that in the
exercise of due care in the instant case the plaintiff could
have discovered the defect, yet in the absence of any dishonest
purpose or actual notice, the latter should not be deprived of
his status as a holder in due course.
JAMES LEWIS MANN CROMER.

CONTRACTS-Right of Broker to All or Part of Earnest
Money on Failure of Contract. - The vendor, plaintiff,
entered into a written contract with vendee to sell certain
lands for $4,500. The vendee delivered to the broker checks
amounting to $500 as earnest money, the balance to be paid
in sixty days. The vendee defaulted and the broker refused
to deliver the earnest money to the vendor, whereupon he
brought this suit against the vendee and the broker. The
broker answered contending that in accordance with a local
custom, he was entitled to one-half of the earnest money. The
vendee answered contending that the land was not suited for
the purposes claimed. The written contract provided "that
the earnest money deposit will be retained by the seller in
the event that the purchaser fails to settle within the 60 days
period provided herein." There was evidence to show that
the nature of the land was misrepresented to the vendee due
to misinformation given to the broker. Also, there was evidence to show that the vendee had seen the land himself
before entering into the contract. Upon the trial courts' refusal to grant their motions for directed verdicts, the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court. HELD: Judgment for
plaintiff affirmed. The contract was clear and unambiguous
and there was no showing of fraud. In a concurring opinion
Stukes, C. J., said, on the broker's appeal, that even though
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the custom of the brokers entitling them to one-half of the
earnest money was proved, the weight of the law is to the contrary in the absence of controlling contract provisions. It was
also said that to permit the broker to recover would permit
him to profit by his wrong since it was his misrepresentation
that caused vendee's default. It was immaterial that this
misrepresentation was innocent. Thomas vs. Jeffcoat, - S. C.
-,99 S. E. 2d 240 (1956).
In most of the cases involving the relative rights of the
broker and vendor in the forfeited earnest money, the general
rule is that the money is apportioned according to the provisions of the sales contract or the agreement between the
broker and the vendor. Walmore Investment Company vs.
Farrior-JacksonRealty Company, 218 Ala. 447, 118 So. 665
(1928); Parker vs. Jones, 635 S. W. 2d 858 (Tex. 1933);
George vs. Rodine, 38 Wash. 21 497, 230 P. 2d 608 (1952).
The vendor must be a party to any agreement declaring the
rights of the parties to the forfeited earnest money, or he is
not bound by it and may retain all of the deposit. Dallas v.
Mosely, 150 Ark. 210, 233 S. W. 1084 (1921); Strickel vs.
Brownfield State Bank, 250 S. W. 258 (Tex. 1950). In most
jurisdictions, notwithstanding the provisions of the contract,
the vendor must declare the earnest money forfeited before
the broker has a valid claim to a share of the deposit. If the
vendor chooses not to declare the earnest money forfeited,
the broker cannot recover from the vendor. Kritt vs. Athens
Hills Development Company, 109 Cal. App. 642, 241 P. 2d 606
(1952) ; Berry vs. Keith, 100 A. 2d 831 (D. C. 1954). When
the agreement between broker and vendor provides that the
broker shall have a certain portion of the earnest money, he
can recover it, even if by terms of the agreement he is entitled to no commission until the sale is consummated. Haynes
vs. John Davis & Company, 22 Wash. 2d 474, 156 P. 2d 659
(1945). Also, the converse is true in that if the broker recovers his stipulated share of the earnest money, he is not
entitled to any further commission. Burke vs. Thomas J.
Fisher & Company, 219 F. 2d 767 (D. C. Cir. 1955) ; Shinor
vs. Naylor, 185 S.W. 2d 237 (Tex. 1945). It has been held in
the case of an option contract, where the vendee can forfeit
the deposit money without incurring any further liability,
that this is not a sufficiently binding contract which would
entitle the broker to a share in the deposit, notwithstanding
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an agreement with the vendor stating that the broker's full
commission would be paid out of the deposit money. In upholding this principle, the Court reasoned that to allow the
broker to recover his full commission out of the money paid
for the option, would destroy the consideration which made
the option contract binding on the vendor. Halloranvs. German-American Mercantile Bank, 96 Wash. 336, 165 Pac. 80
(1917). A broker was held to have waived his share in the
earnest money as provided in the sales contract by his conduct in consenting to the return of the earnest money, which
had been placed in escrow, to the vendee. Huttlinger vs. Far
West Enterprises, 281 P. 2d 554 (Cal. 1955). On the other
hand it has also been held that if the vendee's default is due
to the failure of the vendor to produce a good and marketable title, the vendor thereby waives his rights to the deposit.
Douglas vs. McNabb Realty Company, 78 Ga. App. 845, 52
S. E. 2d 550 (1949).
In the case in which no provision is made for the division
of the forfeited earnest money, the weight of authority seems
to be that the vendor may recover the entire amount to the
exclusion of the broker. Peaks vs. Jurgens, 5 Cal. App. 2d
573, 43 P. 2d 569 (1935) ; Wehner vs. Schrader, 119 Colo. 518,
205 P. 2d 225, 9 A. L. R. 2d 489 (1949) ; Bruno vs. Serio, 50
So. 2d 78 (La. 1951) ; Smith vs. Bretschneider,97 N. H. 117,
81 A. 2d 843 (1952). When it is proved that there is a local
custom entitling the broker to a certain portion of the forfeited earnest money, but there is no provision to that effect
in the agreement with the vendor, it has been held that only
the agreement will be looked to by the court in determining
the rights of the parties. M. L. Chambers & Company vs.
Herring, 88 S. W. 371 (Tex. 1905). When it is provided by
contract that the broker's commission is earned upon his procuring a sales contract in spite of the fact that the vendee
does not perform, some cases have held that the forfeited
deposit shall be applied to the payment of the broker's commission, the balance going to the vendor. Jutros vs. Boisvert,
121 Me. 32, 115 Atl. 517 (1921) ; Hatch vs. Dayton, 130 N. J.
L. 425, 33 A. 2d 350 (1943). A few cases have allowed the
broker, in the absence of any controlling provision in his contract with the vendor, to recover his specified percentage of
commission on the amount of the forfeited deposit money,
since the vendor obtained it only through the labours of the
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broker. Piercevs. Powell, 57 Ill. 323 (1870) ; Gilder vs. Davis,

137 N. Y. 504, 33 N. E. 599, 20 L. R. A. 398 (1893) ; Schurr
vs. Warwick, 11 Pa. Dist. 1, 26 Pa. Co. 447 (1901).
Since the parties can stipulate by contract any disposition
of the forfeited earnest money they desire, the controversy
arises mainly in the case where no such stipulation is made.
There is reasoning and authority to support claims of
both the vendor and the broker to the forfeited earnest money.
From the vendor's viewpoint, the forfeited money should
go towards compensating him for the time his land was taken
out of commerce by the sales contract and for the potential
purchasers lost thereby. In the case where the contract says
the broker is to be paid by a commission on the purchase
price, it is argued that the broker has no claim to the forfeited money since the vendor has received no purchase price.
Bruno vs. Serio, supra. To these arguments, the broker's answer is that the forfeited money is in the hands of the vendor
only by the direct result of the broker's services and the
broker should be entitled to a share in it. It is hard to reason
that the parties intended in their agreement that the vendor
should receive these services free of charge. Gilder v. Davis,
supra; Schurr vs. Warwick, supra. A few jurisdictions have
compromised these conflicting claims by allowing the broker
his specified commission on the amount of the forfeited
money instead of the amount of the purchase price. Piercevs.
Powell, supra; Gilder vs. Davis, supra; Schurr vs. Warwick,
supra. The fact that two of these cases involved optional contracts serves to strengthen their position. If a broker should
be allowed compensation out of a forfeited deposit for his
services in procuring an option, it would seem even more justifiable to allow him to recover such compensation when the
broker has obtained for the vendor a binding sales contract.
This seems to be an equitable solution to the problem since it
tends to protect the interests of both parties when they fail
to definitely provide for the disposition of the earnest money
in their agreement.
F. DEAN RAINEY, JR.
EVIDENCE - Attorney - Client Privilege - Protecting
Communications Between Corporation and Its House Counsel Even Though He Is Not a Resident of, Nor Admitted to
Practice in, the State. - In a discovery proceeding, plain-
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tiff moved under rule 34, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
for an order requiring the defendant to produce documents
relating to prior patent litigations. The defendant excepted,
contending that certain of the documents were privileged as
communications with its attorney. The plaintiff contested the
privileged status of the documents on the grounds that defendant's counsel was not licensed to practice in New York
where the communications and litigations took place. It was
conceded that counsel was a member of the District of Columbia and Pennsylvania Bars. HELD: Judgment for defendant. A lawyer regularly employed by a corporation as
legal counsel who actively participates in litigation qualifies
as an "attorney" within the rule of privileged communications between attorney and client, even though he is not licensed to practice in the state. Georgia-PacificPlywood Co.
v. U. S. Plywood Corporation, 18 F. R. D. 463 (S. D. N. Y.
1956).
The admission of attorneys of a sister state to litigate a
particular case is generally granted as a matter of courtesy,
Browne et al. v. Phelps, 211 Mass. 376, 97 N. E. 762 (1912) ;
North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 27 Wyo. 271, 195 Pac.
988 (1921), and is generally authorized and regulated by
statutes and rules of the respective states. Code of Laws of
South Carolina,1952 See. 56-125. Such admission to litigate
a particular case does not constitute a general license to practice law. Manning v. Roanoke & T. R. R. Co., 122 N. C. 824,
28 S. E. 963 (1898) ; North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 27
Wyo. 271, 195 Pac. 988 (1921). There is a dearth of judicial
authority on whether an attorney licensed in one jurisdiction
is an "attorney" within the meaning of the attorney-client
privilege while practicing in other areas. It was held in U. S.
v. Mammoth Oil Co., 56 Ont. L. Rep. 635, 2 DLR 966 (1925),
which involved a member of the Ontario Bar who gave legal
advice to a U. S. citizen in New York concerning American
law, that the communication was not privileged. A United
States District Court sitting in Massachusetts has held that
attorneys licensed in other states and employed in a corporate patent department were not within the privilege because
their work was primarily non-legal; but, by way of dictum,
the court indicated the privilege might otherwise apply to out
of state counsel who are acting in a legal capacity. U. S. 'V.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. C. Mass. 1950).
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Having determined that out of state attorneys perhaps
qualify for this privilege, the question then arises whether a
house counsel succeeds to all the privileges of an attorney.
It is a common arrangement for a corporation to employ at
least one member of the bar who receives a periodic salary,
uses the corporation's facilities, and works only for the corporation. He is termed a "house counsel", and in most jurisdictions he qualifies as an attorney. Conn. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Sheilds et al. v. Home Life Insurance Co., 16
F. R. D. 5, (S. D. N. Y. 1954) ; Scoutes v. Fred W. Albuch,
15 F. R. D. 55 (N. D. Ohio 1953) ; U. S. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. C. Mass. 1950). Communications
between a house counsel and his client are privileged if the
house counsel is acting in a legal capacity at the time. Conn.
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sheilds et al. Home Life Insurance
Co., 16 F. R. D. 5 (S. D. N. Y. 1954); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954);
U. S. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp, 357 (D. C. Mass.
1950). In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America,
supra, the court held that bar membership should properly
be of the court for the area where the services are rendered,
but this is not a sine qua non, and that a house counsel who
practices law only for the corporation client and its affiliates
and not for the public, generally is not required to be a member of the local bar by the local authorities.
The holding in the principal case is strongly supported by
practical considerations and social policy. Full-time legal
counsel employed by corporations should not be required to
take bar examinations and be licensed to practice in the many
states where they may communicate with their clients. Although usually considered an employee, he is by the ethics
of the profession an independent contractor, and when acting in a legal capacity, a communication between the house
counsel and his client should be privileged regardless of
whether he is a member of the bar where the communication
occurs. Recent federal cases held that a house counsel qualifies under attorney-client privileges, and since perhaps the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will be adopted in South
Carolina, it is felt that our courts will use these decisions as a
guide in formulating their decisions. As South Carolina, by
statute, authorizes non-resident attorneys to litigate particular cases, it appears only logical that our courts would hold
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that a house counsel is entitled to have privileged communications with his client even in the absence of bar membership
and residence. It is therefore submitted that admission to litigate a case before any recognized and established court of
law should be sufficient to qualify house counsel as an attorney within the scope of attorney-client privilege for communications directly connected with that action.
M. R.

JOHNSON, JR.

EVIDENCE-Admissibility of Evidence Showing Refusal
to Submit to Chemical Test of Blood Content. - Appellant
was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. During the trial before the City
Recorder, with a jury, evidence was submitted by the City of
Charleston that appellant had refused to submit to a chemical test designed to measure the alcoholic content of his blood.
Appellant was convicted and sentenced and he appealed to
the General Sessions Court of Charleston County where the
conviction was affirmed. Appeal was taken to the Supreme
Court of South Carolina on the grounds that appellant could
not be compelled to be a witness against himself and that it
was error for the attorney for the respondent to comment
to the jury upon his refusal to submit to the chemical test of
his blood. HELD: Judgment affirmed. Appellant's constitutional rights were not violated by admitting testimony of his
failure to submit to a chemical test of his blood content. State
v. Smith, 230 S. C. 164, 94 S. E. 2d 886 (1956).
The admission in evidence of the results of a scientific examination of a substance taken from the body of accused without his objection is not in violation of his privilege not to be
a witness against himself. State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72
P. 2d 435 (1937). Some courts hold that the results of experiments on such substances, even when taken without the consent of the accused, are admissible. State v. Gatton, 60 Ohio
App. 192, 20 N. E. 2d 265 (1938). A study of the cases shows
a confusion in the minds of some courts between the admissibility of a circumstance in evidence and its weight when admitted. The circumstances should be admitted and their
weight left to the jury. People v. Graves, 137 Cal. App. 1, 10,
29 P. 2d 807, 811, 30 P. 2d 508 (1934). It is proper to show
the defendant's conduct, demeanor and statements (not merely
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self-serving) whether oral or written, and his attitude toward
the crime, if there was one. These are circumstances that may
be shown and their weight is for the jury to determine. The
fact that defendant declined to submit to a blood test is such
a circumstance and it may be shown. State v. Benson, 230
Iowa 1168, 300 N. W. 275 (1941). Where actions may speak
louder than words, the jury should be permitted to consider
both. People v. McGinnis, 267 P. 2d 458 (Cal. 1953). It is not
what the defendant says or refuses to say that is significant,
but rather what he does or refuses to do that may give rise to
a presumption. There is a close analogy to be drawn between
the circumstances of flight from the scene or the use of an
alias and that of refusal to submit to a harmless scientific
test as constituting a fact which is indicative of a consciousness of guilt. State v. Benson, supra. The scope of the constitutional privilege against self incrimination, in history and in
principle, includes only the process of testifying, by word of
mouth or in writing, i. e., the process of disclosure by utterance. 1 GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE, Self Incrimination,16th Ed.,
sect. 469 (e) ; 5 HARV. LAW REV. 71 (1891). It has no application to such physical, evidential circumstances as may exist
on the witness' body or about his person. The privilege does
not rest on the extreme notion that a guilty person is entitled
to conceal as much as he can of the evidence of his crime;
but on the notion that he should not be made to confess it
out of his own mouth. GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE, supra. Mr.
Justice Holmes once stated that the prohibition of compelling
a man in a criminal case to be a witness against himself is a
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from him, not an exclusion of his body as
evidence when it may be material. Holt v. United States, 218
U. S. 245, 31 S. Ct. 2 (1910). The constitutional inhibition
against self incrimination relates only to disclosure by utterance. State v. Gatton, supra. In the case of State v. Nutt,
78 Ohio App. 336, 65 N. E. 2d 675 (1946), the court cited with
approval the principle laid down in State v. Gatton, supra, and
stated that the prosecutor's comments to the jury concerning
the defendant's refusal to submit to a blood test did not violate
the constitutional provision against self incrimination because
the provision related merely to testimony by the accused.
Although there is some authority to the contrary, Apodaca
v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. Rep. 593, 146 S. W. 2d 381 (1940),
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28 RULING CASE LAW 434, Sec. 20, the great majority of the
courts and the better reasoning seem to support the proposition that a defendant may not be compelled to submit to a
chemical analysis of his blood content, but if he does refuse
to submit, his refusal may be commented upon by the prosecutor. This would not be a violation of the constitutional
rights of the defendant because his refusal is only one circumstance to be considered by the jury, and it is the function of
the jury to reach a conclusion in the light of all circumstances
of the case.
HERBERT W. LOUTHIAN.

INTERRACIAL ADOPTION. - Petitioner, a negro, instituted this proceeding in the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia, for the adoption of a white child. The child
was born out of wedlock in 1949, and the whereabouts of the
natural father, a white man, were unknown. Petitioner married the natural mother, a white woman, in 1951. The District
Judge, in denying the petition, refused to subject the child
to the possibility of losing the social status of a white person,
by reason of the fact that the record would show that his
father was a negro if the petition should be granted. On appeal, HELD: Reversed and remanded with directions to grant
the adoption. The Appellate Court ruled that the distinction
between the "social status" of whites and negroes did not
justify denial of adoption. In re Minor, 228 Fed. 2d 446 (D. C.
Cir. 1955).
Adoption of a child was a proceeding unknown to the common law and exists today in this country solely by virtue of
statutory law. In re Schwab's Adoption, 355 Pa. 534, 50 A.
2d 504 (1947) ; Driggersv. Jolley, 219 S. C. 31, 64 S. E. 2d 19
(1951). These statutes enacted by the various state legislatures vary in their requirements as to who may adopt another.
1 Am. JuR., Adoption of Childrens. 12. Some states explicitly
prohibit interracial adoption, DART'S LA. GEN. STAT. at 1947,
§ 2; VERNON'S TEX. CIV. STAT. 1947, ART. 46 (a) § 8, while
others merely require the race of petitioners be included on the
application. CODE OF LAWS OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 1940 s.
16-201; Remington's Wash. Rev. Stat., 1943 Supp., § 1699-7.
South Carolina prohibits the placing of a white child in the
permanent custody of a negro, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952 s. 16-553, but no mention of race is made in the
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statutes governing adoption in this state, as they now stand,
Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952 s. 10-2581 thru s.
10-2587, or in the new proposed bill regulating adoption.
Note, 9 S. C. L. Q. 210, 227 (1957). In South Carolina an
illegitimate child cannot be adopted if both parents were unmarried at the time of the child's birth and could not have
legally contracted marriage. Code of Laws of South Carolina,
1952 s. 10-2585. Under South Carolina's miscegenation statute, Code of Laws of South Carolina,1952 s. 20-7, this would
mean that a child born to a white and a negro could not be
adopted by either race. Note, 9 S. C. L. Q. 210, 212 & n. 16
(1957). At least one state, however, has held that an illegitimate child born to a white and a negro prior to enactment
of miscegenation statutes could be legally adopted. Heirs v.
Kell, 125 La. 87, 51 So. 77 (1910). In a situation which arises
more frequently in adoption proceedings, where the question
of religion rather than race must be considered, some states
require courts, where practicable, to place a child in a family
with the same religious beliefs as the natural parents. Petitions of Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 121 N. E. 2d 843 (1954);
Re Anonymous, 195 Misc. 6, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 829 (1949). However, where the religious factor is not made mandatory by
statute, the courts will not necessarily follow it. In re Minnicar, 141 Cal. App. 2d 703, 297 P. 2d 105 (1956) ; Puriton v.
Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N. E. 802 (1907). Since adoption
is controlled entirely by statute, in absence of statutory prohibition the fact that the adopting parents and adopted child
are of different races is no obstacle to the proceeding. In re
Pepin's Estate, 53 Mont. 240, 163 Pac. 104 (1917) ; 2 C. J. S.,
Adoption of Childrens. 17. The states are in unanimous agreement that the welfare of the child is paramount, and although
the statutes do not in terms provide, this will be the prime
consideration of the court in granting adoption decrees. Petition of Kollman, 10 Ill. App. 2d 336, 134 N. E. 2d 629 (1956);
Magevney v. Karsh, 167 Tenn. 32, 65 S. W. 2d 562 (1933).
It is at least conceivable that the question of interracial
adoption will, in the future, confront the courts of all jurisdictions to a greater extent than it has in the past. The scope
of this problem will be somewhat narrowed in states which,
although having no statutes, either by oversight or design,
which prohibit interracial adoption, do have miscegenation
statutes. Even this view of the situation, however, may be
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somewhat nebulous. Some modern writers feel, in the light
of recent Supreme Court decisions, that if the constitutionality of miscegenation statutes is ever before the Court in a
proper case, the Supreme Court will rule adversely to the
statutes. Weinberger, A Reappraisal of the Constitutionality
of Miscegenation Statutes, 42 Cornell L. Q. 208 (1957). This
step has already been taken by the highest Court in California,
which, in a 4-3 decision, ruled that California's statute prohibiting interracial marriage was repugnant to the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P. 2d 17 (1948). The unconstitutionality cry has also been voiced by some in regard to state
statutes which require adopting parents to be of the same religious faith as that of the natural parents. Pfeffer, Religion
in the Upbringing of Children,35 Boston Univ. Law Rev. 334
(1955). One can only speculate as to the determination of
these cases if and when they are ever before the Supreme
Court for judicial decision. It would seem however, that if
the Court finds these statutes to be unconstitutional, a similar
fate would be in store for statutes prohibiting interracial
adoption. In allowing the adoption in the instant case, and in
view of the peculiar facts before it, the District of Columbia
-Court, in the absence of statutory prohibitions, did what it
thought best for the child's welfare. Since the instant case
-was decided one court has followed the opinion, Fountain v.
Fountain, 9 Ill. App. 2d 482, 133 N. E. 2d 532 (1956), but
it is extremely doubtful if other jurisdictions will do likewise.
In view of the grave psychological and social problems involved, the racial similarity between the adopting parents and
child should be a condition precedent to considering other
aspects of the child's welfare. Before granting a petition
that for all legal purposes changes the race of an individual,
it would seem that a better means of insuring the welfare of
the child would be to postpone determination until the child
is old enough to make the decision for himself.
WM. F. POPE.
TORTS-Negligence-Liability of Manufacturer to Remote Purchaser When the Damage Was to the Article Only.
- Plaintiff purchased airplanes which contained latently defective engines manufactured by the defendant. The defects in
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the engines caused the engines to damage themselves in actual
operation. Upon discovering the defects, the plaintiff repaired
all of the engines. The plaintiff alleges that the engines, due
to the latent defects, were imminently dangerous because they
were negligently constructed, and sues for cost of repairing
said engines. On motion to dismiss, HELD: Motion granted
for failure of complaint to state a cause of action. There
is a cause of action against the manufacturer only when the
article, which is inherently dangerous, because negligently
made, causes an accident. Trans World Airlines v. CurtissWright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N. Y. S. 2d 284 (1955).
As laid down in the English case of Winterbottom v.
Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 11 L. J. Ex. 415 (1842), a remote
purchaser could not maintain a cause of action against a
manufacturer for injuries caused by a defective product negligently made by the manufacturer, in the absence of privity of
contract. Huset v. J. L Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed.
865 (8th Cir. 1903) ; National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.
S. 195 (1879). This rule has been subjected to continuous
modification by the courts. The courts began by developing
several exceptions, overlooking the lack of privity, under certain circumstances. The first exception held the manufacturer
liable to a third person when the manufacturer knew the
product was dangerous for its intended use, failed to disclose
that fact to the buyer, and the buyer was injured by such use.
Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., supra; Larrabie v.
Des Moines Tent & Awning Co., 189 Iowa 319, 178 N. W. 373
(1920). Another important exception held the manufacturer
liable for negligence, in the absence of privity, to the ultimate
user for injuries caused by a product which was inherently
dangerous to human safety. Bloods Balm Co. v. Cooper, 83 Ga.
457, 10 S. E. 118, 5 L. R. A. 612 (1889) ; Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397 (1852). This rule was extended to include not
only articles that are inherently dangerous, but also articles
that became imminently dangerous if negligently constructed.
Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 470 (1882) ; Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co.,
195 N. Y. 478, 88 N. E. 1063 (1909). These cases laid the
groundwork for the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916), which held
the manufacturer liable for personal injuries to the ultimate
purchaser of a defectively constructed automobile when a
wheel collapsed and threw the plaintiff out, injuring him.
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Later cases have upheld the rule laid down in this case that
a manufacturer is liable for his negligence, even if there is no
privity, if the product becomes dangerous when negligently
made, and personal injuries or property' damages are foreseeable. Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F. 2d 310 (6th Cir.
1930) ; Simmons Co. v. Hardin, 75 Ga. App. 429, 43 S. E. 2d
553 (1947). In the MacPherson case, the liability was for
personal injuries sustained by the ultimate purchaser, and
subsequent cases extended the rule to cover other situations.
It has been extended to cover injuries to the purchaser's employees, Rosebrook v. General Electric Co., 236 N. Y. 227, 140
N. E. 571 (1923); Marsh Wood Product Co. v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N. W. 392 (1932), and to other
users of the chattel. Lill v. Murphy Door Bed Co., 290 Ill. App.
328, 8 N. E. 2d 714 (1937) ; Hoenig v. Central Stamping Co.,
273 N. Y. 485, 6 N. E. 2d 415 (1936). Liability has been extended to members of a remote purchaser's family. Baker v.
Sears, Roebuck Co., 16 F. Supp. 925 (S. D. Cal. 1936) ; White
Sewing Mach. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 318 Mo. 397, 1
S. W. 2d 122 (1909). The purchaser has been allowed to recover against the manufacturers of defective component parts
of the finished products. Spencer v. Madsen, 142 F. 2d 820
(10th Cir. 1944) ; Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N. Y. 292,
181 N. E. 576 (1932). Liability of the manufacturer has even
been extended to a purchaser who buys a second-hand article.
Beadles v. Servel, Inc., 344 Ill. App. 133, 100 N. E. 2d 405
(1951) ; Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 167 App. Div. 433,
153 N. Y. S. 131 (1915). Recovery has also been allowed for
damages to property owned by others than the purchaser
caused by the defective article. United States Radiator Corp.
v. Henderson, 68 F. 2d 87 (10th Cir. 1933) ; Genesee County
PatronsFireRelief Ass'n. v. L. Sonneborn Sons, 269 N.Y. 463,
189 N. E. 551 (1934). The courts have allowed recovery
for the manufacturer's negligence when the damage resulting
from an accident was to the defective article only. For example, recovery was allowed for a truck-tractor when it was
damaged when it overturned due to a defective housing assembly. International Harvester Co. v. Sharoff, 202 F. 2d 52
(10th Cir. 1953). The remote purchaser was allowed to recover for damage to an automobile which resulted from an
accident caused by defective brakes. Quackenbush v. Ford
Motor Co., supra. The courts have, so far, in the absence of
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privity, refused to permit recovery for financial losses caused
by a manufacturer's negligence in the absence of personal
injuries or property damages attributable to an accident.
Karl's Shoe Stores Ltd. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 145
F. Supp. 376 (D. Mass. 1956) ; A. J. P. Contracting Corp. v.
Brooklyn Builders Supply Co., 171 Misc. 157, 11 N. Y., S. 2d
662 (1939) (Affirmed without opinion, 258 App. Div. 747,
15 N. Y. S. 2d 424) ; 283 N. Y. 692, 28 N. E. 2d 412 (1940).
As the rule now stands, the manufacturer, despite the absence of privity of contract, is liable to the remote purchaser
of a latently defective article when the damage is to the article only, if an accident occurs as a result of negligence in the
manufacture of the article or component part thereof rendering such article inherently dangerous. In the principal case,
the court relied upon the case of A. J. P. Contracting Corp. v.
Brooklyn Builders Supply Co., supra, which denied recovery
where building laths purchased by the plaintiff failed to retain plaster. In that case the plaintiff sued for the cost of
removing and replacing the laths. That case can be distinguished from the principal case in that the defective laths
were not inherently dangerous instruments, whereas an airplane with a latently defective engine would certainly fall
into the category of an inherently dangerous instrument. If
the article is dangerous, or apt to be if defectively made, the
manufacturer has a duty to see that it is not defective. To
base this duty upon the occurrence of an accident is to put a
narrow restriction on the MacPherson doctrine, and is to say
that no duty exists until there is an accident. The duty
should exist from the moment the manufacturer undertakes
the construction of the article while it is in his control. The
plaintiff, no doubt, has the duty of making frequent inspections of the engines, but under the present rule, even if he
makes an inspection, discovers the defects, thereby averting
the possibility of an accident, he cannot recover from the
manufacturer. The plaintiff is, in fact, penalized for his diligence. Under the present rule there must be some foreseeable
injury to person or property before any liability arises. The
fact that a defective engine will damage itself while operating,
is just as foreseeable as is the fact that the airplane may be
involved in an accident. No one will deny that the plaintiff
could recover if the airplane crashes. The proper solution,
therefore, would be to extend the MacPhersonrule to its logi-
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cal terminus, and permit recovery regardless of whether or
not there is an accident. If this is done the party who by his
negligence causes the damage, will suffer the loss.
RAEFORD D. PHILLIPS.

TORTS-Right of Privacy. - Defendant news service
caused to be published in a local newspaper and distributed nationally through its facilities, that the plaintiff was the 12year old mother of a day-old baby boy. The article contained
the facts that the plaintiff and her husband had been married
one year prior to the birth of the "fine and healthy" baby, and
listed his weight. The plaintiff and her husband brought suit
for damages for invasion of the right of privacy, alleging that
the defendant, despite the wishes and requests of the plaintiff,
had spitefully and maliciously caused the article to be published and circulated, and had thereby exposed the plaintiff
to public gaze and made her an object of scorn and ridicule
because of her youth at the time of the birth. The complaint
further alleged that she had suffered extreme embarrassment,
humiliation, and mental anguish. The lower court sustained
the demurrer to the complaint on the ground that it did not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. On appeal, HELD: Affirmed. The facts do not show an unwarranted invasion of the right of privacy because of the legitimate public or general interest in the occurrence, and the
article could not be reasonably calculated to embarrass or
humiliate the plaintiffs or cause mental distress. Meetze V.
Associated Press,230 S. C. 330, 95 S. E. 2d 606 (1956).
The right of privacy is the right of an individual to be free
from unwarranted publicity. Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37
So. 2d 118 (1948) ; Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W.
967, 55 A. L. R. 964 (1927) ; Holloman v. Life Insurance Co.
of Virginia, 192 S. C. 454, 7 S. E. 2d 169, 127 A. L. R. 110
(1940). An actionable invasion of this right is constituted by
the publication of one's private affairs with which the public
has no legitimate concern, Cason v. Baskin, 159 Fla. 31, 30 So.
2d 635 (1947); Brents v. Morgan, supra, or the wrongful
intrusion into one's private activities, in such manner as to
outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to
a person of ordinary sensibilities. Continental Optical Co. v.
Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N. E. 2d 306, 14 A. L. R. 2d 743
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(1949). The right is distinct in itself, and not merely incidental to some other right for the breach of which an action
for damages will lie. Fairfieldv. American Photocopy Equipment Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291 P. 2d 194 (1955) ; Pavesich
v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68,
69 L. R. A. 101; Gregory v. Bryan-Hunt Co., 295 Ky. 345, 174
S. W. 2d 510 (1943). The violation of the right of privacy
is a tort, Smith v. Doss, supra; Continental Optical Co. v.
Reed, supra; Holloman v. Life Insurance Co., supra, and is
directly concerned with the claimant's own peace of mind.
Themo v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 306 Mass.
54, 27 N. E. 2d 753 (1940). The motives of the person sought
to be charged are immaterial in determining if there is a
right of action, if the communication or publication does not
otherwise violate the right of privacy. Sidis v. F-R Publishing
Corp., 113 F. 2d 806 (2d Cir.), 138 A. L. R. 15 (1940), certiorari denied 61 S. Ct. 393, 311 U. S. 711, Lewis v. Physicians
and Dentists Bureau, 27 Wash. 2d 267, 177 P. 2d 896 (1947).
It is not necessary for the claimant to allege or prove special
damages in order to entitle him to recover. Reed v. Real
Detective Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P. 2d 133 (1945) ;
Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E. 55
(1938). The general principle is that the right is a purely
personal one, and can only be asserted by the person whose
privacy has been invaded. Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, 28 F. Supp.
845 (N. D. Cal. 1939) ; Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co.,
supra; Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304,
95 P. 2d 491 (1939). The right of privacy is not an absolute
right, however, State ex rel Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364,
66 N. E. 2d 755 (1946) ; Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199,
159 S. W. 2d 291 (1942), and it is subject to certain limitations. The right does not extend to the protection of supersensitiveness. Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273,
239 P. 2d 630 (1952) ; Cason v. Baskin, supra; Davis v. General Finance and Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S. E. 2d
225 (1950). This right ceases upon the publication of the
facts by the individual or with his consent. Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N. E. 2d 306 (1949) ;
Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967, 55 A. L. R. 964
(1927) ; Marek v. Zanol ProductsCo., 298 Mass. 1, 9 N. E. 2d
393 (1937). The right does not prohibit the communication
of any matter, though in its nature private, when the publica-
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tion is made under circumstances which would render it a
privileged communication according to the rule of libel and
slander. Brents v. Morgan, supra. In addition, the right of
privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is
of legitimate public or general interest, and not actually
shameful in its nature. Garnerv. Triangle Publications,Inc.,
97 F. Supp. 546 (S. D. N. Y. 1951) ; Metter v. Los Angeles
Examiner, supra; Themo v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N. E. 2d 753 (1940). An individual cannot claim a right of privacy with regard to that which
cannot, from the very nature of things and by operation of
law, remain private. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, supra.
The recordation of birth certificates in South Carolina with
the local registrar is in pursuance of statute. Code of Laws of
South Carolina 1952, §§ 32-1106 and 32-1121; Code of Laws
of South Carolina, Rules and Regulations of State Board
of Health § 18. When an incident has either become the
subject matter of a public record, Metter v. Los Angeles
Examiner, supra; Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297
P. 91 (1931); Waters v. Fleetwood, 212 Ga. 161, 91 S. E.
2d 344 (1956), or when an individual becomes an actor
in an occurrence of public or general interest, he emerges
from his seclusion and the publication of his connection with
such occurrence is not an invasion of the right of privacy.
Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D.
Minn. 1948) ; Jones v. HeraldPost Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S. W.
2d 972 (1929).
The constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press will
necessarily infringe upon the right of privacy in some areas.
The instant case has justifiably been included in the class
of situations where the public interest in obtaining information of general interest has become dominant to the individual's desire for privacy. The subject matter of the article was
of legitimate public interest, for it is an unusual occurrence
for a 12-year old girl to give birth to a child. The report of the
occurrence was favorable, and the composition of the article
negated any inference of the illegitimacy of the birth. The
report of the birth could not have reasonably humiliated the
plaintiffs or caused mental distress, for her marriage one
year prior was not void, although she was only eleven years
old at the time. In the 52 year history of litigation concerning the right of privacy, it has only been the more flagrant
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breaches of decency and propriety that have constituted an
actionable invasion of this right, and the opinion is well-bottomed due to the fact that the alleged invasion neither comes
within this category nor exceeds the bounds of dissemination
of legitimate news in which the public has a general interest.
C. MARSHALL CAIN.

WILLS-Legacy to Legatee Dead at the Making of the
Will. - Action for a declaratory judgment to construe a
portion of the residuary clause of a will providing as follows:
"One-eighth part to be paid to the child of my deceased sister,
Elizabeth B. Padgett; to him absolutely and forever." The
will was executed on April 28, 1953, at which time the only
child of the named deceased sister was dead, he having died
in November, 1950. The testatrix knew of the death of the
legatee when she executed the will. The claimants were the
surviving sons of the legatee, who had been provided for in
another section of the will. The lower court found for the
claimants, on the grounds that the testatrix did not intend
to die intestate, and that she intended the claimants to take.
HELD-Reversed. The legacy was void ab initio and therefore ineffective and inoperative for the reason that the legatee
was dead at the time of the execution of the will. There was
no lapse statute under which the legatee's sons could claim.
Padgettv. Black, 229 S. C. 142, 92 S. E. 2d 153 (1956).
In the absence of lapse statute which protects the legatee,
the common law rule prevails. Hash v. Hash, 64 Mont. 118,
208 P. 605 (1922) ; Nelson v. Minton, 46 Ohio App. 39, 187
N. E. 576 (1933) ; Suber v. Nash, 84 S. C. 121 (1909) ; Pegues
v. Pegues, 11 Rich. Eq. (S. C. 1860). The undisputed common
law rule is that the legacy is void or lapses if the legatee is
dead when the will is executed or predeceases the testator.
Lindsay v. Pleasants, 39 N. C. 320 (1846); In re Turner's
Will, 208 N. Y. 261, 101 N. E. 905 (1913). In England the
latter rule was changed by statute providing that a legacy to
a child or other issue will not lapse due to the death of such
legatee, but will pass to the surviving child of such legatee.
7 Will and 1 Vict. c. 26 (1837). Most American jurisdictions
also have lapse statutes. Some only save a legacy to
children of the testator, Code of Laws of South Carolina,
1952 Sec. 19-237; Lindsay v. Pleasants, supra; Logan v.
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Brunson, 56 S. C. 7 (1899), while others extend to all relatives of the testator. Nelson v. Minton, supra; Almy v. Jones,
17 R. I. 265, 21 Atl. 616 (1891). In accord with the English
view several jurisdictions hold that these lapse statutes, however broad in scope, do not operate to save the legacy if the
legatee is dead before the will is made. These are based on
the distinction between void and lapsed legacies, the former
being void ab initio, and the latter having become ineffective
subsequent to their inception. Christy v. Smith, 289 S. W. 2d
885 (Ark. 1956); In re Harrison'sEstate, 202 Penn. 331, 51
Atl. 976 (1902); Pegues v. Pegues, supra. But the majority
of these statutes are interpreted as operating to save the
legacy in either event. Nutter v. Vickery, 64 Me. 490 (1874) ;
Casey v. Check's Executors, 94 Va. 517, 27 S. E. 441 (1897).
One court using the following language: "There is no distinction in the application of the (N. Y.) statute as to the death
of the devisee before or after the making of the will, either
case being the mischief intended to be remedied." Barnes v.
Huson, 60 Barb. 598 (N. Y. 1871). This ambiguity has been
eliminated where the statute explicitly includes legatees who
are dead when the will is made. Cheny v. Selman, 71 Ga. 384
(1833) ; Shumaker v. Pearson, 67 Ohio St. 330, 65 N. E. 1005
(1902).
The primary consideration of the court in interpreting a
will is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the testator,
unless that intention contravenes some well settled rule of
law or public policy, but the court must be able to determine
the testator's intent with reasonable certainty, so as not to
enter the field of conjecture. Witty v. Witty, 184 N. C. 385,
114 S. E. 482 (1922) ; In re Martin's Will, 225 N. Y. 248, 174
N. E. 643 (1831); People's National Bank v. Harrison, 198
S. C. 457, 18 S. E. 2d 1 (1941). It has been asserted that
where a will is drawn prior to the death of the legatee, and
a codicil is drawn subsequent thereto there is sufficient evidence of an intention to make a gift to the legatee's issue,
where the fact of the legatee's death is known. Lee v. Lee,
88 Conn. 404, 91 Atl. 269 (1914) ; Dent v. Dent, 113 S. C. 416,
102 S. E. 715 (1920) ; McLaurin v. Newton, 183 S. C. 379,
191 S. E. 59 (1937). However, knowledge by the testator
of the death of the legatee prior to the making of the will is
not sufficient evidence of the testator's intent to save the
legacy, in absence of a codicil. KehI v. Taylor, 275 Ill. 346,
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114 N. E. 125 (1916); Duncan v. Harper,4 S. C. 76 (1871);
In re Hutton's Estate, 106 Wash. 576, 180 P. 882 (1919).
It appears that the law in South Carolina is well settled.
There was clearly no lapse statute under which the legatee's
sons could claim because it will only save a legacy to the
child of the testator. Had the claimants been the sons of the
legatee they still would not have been aided, because the lapse
statute contemplates a gift given. Since the legatee was dead
when the will was made, there could be no one capable of
taking and therefore there could be no gift to be saved. The
prior South Carolina cases of Dent v. Dent, supra, and MeLaurin v. Newton, supra, both of which involved codicils can
be distinguished from the present case. A codicil is a re-publication of the will. When the testator, knowing of the death
of the legatee after the will was made, has a codicil drawn
reaffirming the gift to the dead legatee, the court is justified
in drawing from such action the inference that the testator
intended to substitute the child or children of the legatee.
Such an inference is not justified by the mere execution of the
will, even when done with knowledge of the legatee's death,
since the element of substitution is not present.
JULIAN TOPOREK.
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